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Abstract
Injured children (145 children between 2 and 13 years of age) were recruited from a hospital emergency room and were interviewed about the injury event soon afterward and then twice more at yearly intervals. Their transcripts were coded three ways: completeness of overall structural components of a prototypical injury event (who, when, where, etc.), amount of narrative detail (specifically, unique units of information), and the accuracy of both types of information. Completeness components were also categorized as central or peripheral, and narrative details were coded as pertaining to persons, objects, attributes, locations, or activities. Over time, children maintained consistent completeness scores; that is, the overall structure of the event stayed the same. However, they provided more elaborative detail of all types, and especially about attributes and activities. Only accuracy (of both types of information) deteriorated. Thus, different aspects of their interviews changed in different ways over two years. Implications for assessing changes over time in child witness reports are discussed.
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Children’s Memory Reports Over Time: Getting Both Better and Worse
Children’s long-term memory for highly salient and personally relevant events has been the focus of a number of studies (see reviews in Bauer, 2007, and Peterson, 2002). Various studies have shown that children’s memory reports get worse over time (Goodman, Hirschman, Hepps, & Rudy, 1991; Peterson, 1999; Peterson & Whalen, 2001; Quas et al, 1999; Shrimpton, Oates, & Hayes, 1998), while others have found that they get better over time (Fivush, Sales, Goldberg, Bahrick, & Parker, 2004; Sales, Fivush, Parker, & Bahrick, 2005), and yet others have found that these reports remain equivalent across time (Baker-Ward, Gordon, Ornstein, Larus, & Clubb, 1993; Burgwyn-Bailes, Baker-Ward, Gordon, & Ornstein, 2001; Merritt, Ornstein, & Spicker, 1994; Salmon, Price, & Pereira, 2002). Such divergent conclusions are puzzling, and there have been few explicit attempts to clarify why such discrepancies may occur even though there is considerable forensic importance attached to understanding how children’s memory reports change over time. 
The premise motivating the current research is that at least some of these discrepancies may be related to methodological differences in how children’s reports are assessed, specifically in how they are scored. Various investigators have coded different aspects of children’s memory reports and it may well be that these different aspects change in different ways over time. Unfortunately, to our knowledge there has been little research that has looked at the same data from the same children using both the scoring procedures that have been associated with better memory over time and those associated with worse memory over time. In the present study, we do just that. If the divergent conclusions of various studies are indeed partly related to how memory reports are coded, we can develop expectations about how children’s memory reports may change over time – in what sorts of ways they may improve and likewise in what sorts of ways they may deteriorate. These more focused expectations may in turn assist those who need to predict or interpret children’s testimony across time.  
Change in memory reports over time has long been investigated (see recent reviews in Bauer, 2006, 2007) and decrements in amount and accuracy of recall are typically reported although caveats abound. For example, less (or no) forgetting has been associated with shorter delays before recall, greater event salience and distinctiveness, information that involves core aspects or gist rather than peripheral details, and so on. Change over time is also relevant to theoretical concepts of reminiscence and hypermnesia. Reminiscence is the elicitation of new information in subsequent interviews, whereas hypermnesia is the increase in recall across multiple interviews (Bluck, Levine, & Laulhere, 1999; Bornstein, Liebel, & Scarberry, 1998; La Rooy, Pipe, & Murray, 2005). Hypermnesia is related to reminiscence in that hypermnesia requires new information to be provided, but at the same time there must also be less omission of previously recalled information than addition of new information such that the total amount of information increases across time. Investigators have routinely found that there is more information in memory than is elicited in any single recall attempt and thus the phenomenon of reminiscence is often seen (Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; La Rooy et al., 2005). However, whether or not there is a net increase of information, i.e., hypermnesia, is not reliable, with it sometimes found and sometimes not (see review in La Rooy et al., 2005).
Memory Scoring
The three common methods of assessing children’s recall of highly salient personal events involve (1) assessments of overall completeness, often via a checklist of relevant event features, (2) counting the number of unique units of information or narrative detail, and (3) the accuracy of recall, which would differ depending upon what was coded in the study and thus could apply to either the accuracy of completeness components or the accuracy of narrative detail. 
Recall completeness. This measure captures memory for the event as a whole. It assesses how many of the component aspects of the overall target event are recalled. In some studies, investigators compare children’s recall with a checklist of component aspects in order to assess the number of event features children provide about standardized medical procedures (such as checkups or urinary catheterizations, e.g., Baker-Ward et al, 1993; Burgwyn-Bailes, et al., 2001; Goodman et al., 1991; Merritt et al, 1994; Shrimpton et al., 1998). In addition, if one looks at how many components from the entire checklist are recalled, one can calculate the proportion of features recalled, i.e., completeness. A different but related way of coding memory reports was done by Peterson and her colleagues in studies on memory for injuries requiring hospital emergency room treatment (Peterson, 1999; Peterson & Bell, 1996; Peterson & Whalen, 2001). In contrast to the studies above, the authors did not have a standardized event with on-the-spot records of what had happened. Instead, they assessed recall completeness by developing a standardized prototype of an injury event and a different prototype of a typical hospital treatment event. Through interviewing adult eyewitnesses, they could determine which of the prototype components applied to any particular child’s experience (which varied between children), and using this list, they then assessed the proportion of prototype components that children provided for each type of event. Thus, they could derive a measure of overall recall completeness. 
When the completeness of children’s reports is assessed, there tends to be relatively little change over time although some investigators have found small decreases. For example, Baker-Ward et al (1993) and Merritt et al (1994) found no decrease in the number of features of medical procedures that were reported by 3-7 year old children after a 6 week delay and Burgwyn-Bailes et al (2001) found no significant forgetting after a 1 year delay. Likewise, Peterson and her colleagues (Peterson, 1999; Peterson & Whalen, 2001) found no decrease in the percentage of components of a prototypical injury event that was recalled after either 2 or 5 years. 
Narrative detail. This measure tabulates the number of unique units of information that children provide about people, activities, objects, descriptors, and locations. For example, this has been applied to children’s recall of highly salient medical events such as urinary catheterization (Goodman, Quas, Batterman-Faunce, Riddlesberger, & Kuhn, 1994, 1997; Quas, Bauer, & Boyce, 2004; Quas et al., 1999). A variation is the number of subject-verb propositions that provide new information, and this has been used to evaluate memory reports for such highly salient events as a destructive hurricane (Bahrick, Parker, Fivush, & Levitt, 1998; Fivush et al., 2004; Sales et al., 2005). In this method of scoring memory reports the investigator does not have a pre-developed list of features or prototype components to be recalled; rather, the amount of narrative detail in the report is tabulated. This gives one a sense of how extensive or embellished children’s reports are. When investigators use this method of scoring, sometimes substantial improvements in children’s memory over time have been reported. For example, 6 years after Hurricane Andrew, children provided considerably more information about the event than they had originally (Fivush et al., 2004; Sales et al., 2005). These children demonstrated both reminiscence (the recall of new information) as well as hypermnesia (the total amount of information increased).
Comparing recall completeness and narrative detail scoring systems. Completeness of recall and number of narrative details (or unique units of information) have a different focus although they are complementary ways of assessing children’s recall. When scoring recall completeness, each prototype component is scored as present or not, regardless of how much narrative detail is provided. However, when scoring for narrative detail, each new detail is separately counted. Compare “we were at my Nan’s” with “we were at my Nan’s, behind the green shed that’s next to her house.” These are equivalent under the prototype completeness scoring since both state the location of described events and location is one of the component features of the prototype, but the latter contains considerably more narrative detail. Both ways of assessing children’s recall are important forensically even though they provide a different perspective. When children provide a relatively complete account of a target experience, they include information about who, what, when, where, and the sequence of events that occurred. In other words, they provide information about the overall structure of the event, which is considerably more helpful in forensic situations than someone who only relates a few components of the event, even if those components are recalled accurately. However, children’s accounts are even more useful if they are rich in descriptive detail rather than being a sparse, skeletal account. In addition, children who provide rich descriptive detail about events are more likely to be believed as a witness (Bala, Lee, & McNamara, 2001).  
Currently, little research directly compares these two ways of assessing memory; an exception is Baker-Ward, Ornstein, Gordon, Follmer, and Clubb (1995). They scored 5- and 7-year-old children’s recall of a pediatric examination in ways that parallel both the completeness and narrative detail methods described above. For completeness, they assessed the proportion of specific features (defined by a predetermined checklist) of a well-child examination that were provided by children, and for amount of information, they counted the number of units of information children provided (scored similarly to the present report). Importantly, their comparison of the two coding systems was limited to data from only part of the interview. Specifically, they only analyzed children’s responses to initial free recall questions and omitted responses to all the other questions asked in the interviews. The investigators found that children’s age was a significant factor in both types of analyses and that little incorrect information was provided. They also compared the rank orderings of children when scored with both coding systems, and the correlation was quite high. Their conclusion was that general findings about children’s memory (such age effects and overall memory competence) were unlikely to be artifacts of procedural differences in scoring. As well, they emphasized that the two scoring systems targeted different aspects of child recall and thus provide differing albeit complementary views of child memory. However, they did not trace children’s performance across time and the age range for children was limited.
Accuracy. Accuracy has typically been assessed by tabulating commission errors and calculating either the number of such errors or the proportion of relevant information that children provide that is correct (i.e, not a commission error). The number of commission errors (as well as the proportion of correct information) has been assessed both when completeness scoring procedures and narrative detail procedures are used. In those studies where there was a checklist or video of medical or experimental procedures, children’s memory was compared with records collected at the time. For interviews about unexpected and idiosyncratic injuries, children’s reports were compared with accounts from adult witnesses. Another method that has been used is to ask parents to review transcripts of child interviews. Unlike findings with either completeness or amount of narrative detail, changes in children’s accuracy (specifically, the number of commission errors) have consistently been reported to reflect accuracy decrements across time because children make increasing numbers of commission errors in their recall. However, just as there have so far been no direct comparisons of children’s memory reports scored both using completeness and narrative detail procedures, there have also been no comparisons of accuracy rates when what is being scored is so different. That is, scoring a global measure of ‘location’ for accuracy under the completeness scoring system, i.e., whether or not a location is provided, is different from scoring for accuracy all the narrative descriptive details that may also be provided about that location. For example, a child may identify her injury as having taken place at her Nan’s, and under the completeness scoring system this is scored as accurate since it happened there. However, even though the child correctly identified the location as ‘Nan’s’, she may well have incorrectly described the specific place where events took place, e.g., she identified Nan’s front yard by her fence when events actually happened in the back yard which has no fence. These commission errors are captured by the narrative detail scoring system although not the prototype-component completeness system. The current study uses both the completeness and narrative detail scoring methods, and assesses accuracy according to both systems of scoring by tabulating commission errors as defined by each system and then calculating the proportion of recall that is correct. This will provide a more differentiated assessment of how children’s memory reports change across time.
Event Being Recalled
One of the most consistent findings in the literature is that the event being recalled affects the quality of memory reports. In a review of children’s recall of autobiographical events, Peterson (2002) found that event salience and emotionality were robust predictors of the quality of long-term recall. As contrasting examples, preschoolers recalled approximately 20-30% of the features of a living-room camping trip when interviewed only one day or three weeks later (Boland, Haden, & Ornstein, 2003; Haden, Ornstein, Eckerman, & Didow, 2001; Ornstein, Haden, & Hedrick, 2004) but 75% of the features of facial surgery events (caused by injuries) when they were interviewed a full year later (Burgwyn-Bailes et al., 2001). Distinctiveness of events also is important. Events that are similar to others which have frequently happened are less likely to be recalled, as are the details of individual repeated events. In terms of the present study, a unique and highly salient event is the target event being recalled – an event that also elicited considerable emotion at the time it occurred (Peterson, 1999; Peterson & Bell, 1996; Peterson & Whalen, 2001). Specifically, the target event is an injury serious enough to require hospital emergency room treatment. Although some prior reports have also looked at children’s recall of their hospital treatment, recall of this event is not included here because the hospital event contains a lot of components that are highly similar to components of other visits to that emergency room for other reasons, such as visits due to illness. Indeed, children of comparable ages have visited this emergency room an average of 12 times prior to the visit necessitated by the injury that was the target event (Peterson & Bell, 1996).
Hypotheses
The primary hypothesis is that different aspects of children’s memory reports will change differentially over time. Specifically, (1) accuracy will decrease, regardless of whether accuracy of prototype components or narrative details is measured, in keeping with findings from a host of prior studies. This will be reflected by increasing proportions of recalled information that are commission errors. (2) Completeness will remain fairly constant over time, as found in earlier reports about similar events (Peterson, 1999; Peterson & Whalen, 2001). That is, children will continue to provide a similar amount of injury prototype components, reflecting similarity in how well the overall event is recalled. (3) In contrast, the amount of narrative detail provided by children will increase over time. We predict that children’s reports will reflect reminiscence in that we doubt that any single report will provide all the details of children’s memories of these complex events. We also predict hypermnesia, parallel to findings about children’s reports about hurricane experiences (Fivush et al., 2004; Sales et al., 2005). In addition, we will also investigate patterns of change for different types of narrative detail. We have no theoretically driven predictions about differences between various types of detail, but in applied settings such as forensic ones, it may be useful to know what sorts of details children are especially likely to recall more of over time, or whether some sorts of detail are particularly likely to deteriorate in accuracy. This aspect of the study is strictly exploratory. 
Method
Participants
Children were recruited from the emergency room of a children’s hospital. Because medical care is free in Canada, the sample was a cross-section of the community. Children had had a trauma injury, mostly bone fractures or lacerations requiring suturing. A total of 201 children participated in the initial and 1-year interview: 21 2-year-olds (16 girls, mean age 2;6), 65 3/4-year-olds (29 girls, mean age 4;1), 68 5/6-year-olds (29 girls, mean age 5;10), 23 8/9-year-olds (12 girls, mean age 9;1), and 24 12/13-year-olds (9 girls, mean age 12;10). However, at the 2-year follow-up interview, there were 145 children: 17 2-year-olds (12 girls, mean age 2;5), 39 3/4-year-olds (19 girls, mean age 4;0), 48 5/6-year-olds (23 girls, mean age 5;10), 21 8/9-year-olds (11 girls, mean age 8;11), and 20 12/13-year-olds (8 girls, mean age 12;7). Thus, only 145 children had all three interviews. Participant loss was due to inability to make contact with families (42 participants) or families choosing to no longer participate (14 participants). Of the 201 participants, the data of 96 children had been included in Peterson, 1999, specifically 11 2-year-olds, 18 3 /4-year-olds, 26 5/6-year-olds, 22 8/9-year-olds, and 19 12/13-year-olds. 
Procedure
Families were approached in the emergency room and a research assistant described the study and gave them a written description to take home. Interested families provided contact information. A few days later, families were contacted to answer questions and set up home visits. During those visits, children and parental witnesses were independently interviewed using the same interview protocol. In the interview, free recall was elicited first (“Tell me about what happened when you/your child got hurt”). Subsequently, interviewees were asked a series of mostly wh- questions about the injury (e.g., where and when did it occur, what caused it) and then the hospital visit (e.g., what did the doctor do), although this report only focuses on the injury event since multiple aspects of the hospital visit were similar to many other prior hospital visits for illness, etc. by children (Peterson & Bell, 1996). (See Appendix for topics of interview questions.) Both 1 and 2 years later, parents were re-contacted for follow-up interviews and during the phone conversation they were asked to refrain from talking to their child about target events prior to the researcher’s visit. The same interview was administered to children at all three visits. All aspects of the study were approved by the University’s Human Investigation Committee for ethical treatment of human participants.
Data Coding
Recall completeness. Idealized prototypes of typical injury events were developed in earlier research (Peterson & Bell, 1996), and interview questions queried all components of these prototypes. As well, all prototype components were identified as central or peripheral according to Heuer and Reisberg’s (1992) distinction of plot relevant versus plot-irrelevant information. In Peterson and Bell (1996), peripheral details were additionally subdivided into two categories but these are combined here. (See Appendix for classification of prototype components as central versus peripheral.) Although every child's injury experience was unique in some ways, it nevertheless conformed to this idealized prototypical pattern. Through searching parent transcripts one could determine which prototype components applied to each child. Although most prototype components applied to all children (e.g., the injury occurred at a specific time and location), some prototype components only applied to a subset of the children (e.g., "objects of home treatment" was not relevant to a child who was immediately rushed to the hospital after injury rather than taken inside the home first for initial treatment). Because there were different numbers of prototype components that applied to each child, different children had different numbers of scorable components that could potentially be present in their recall. After determining which prototype components applied to each child, their transcripts were searched to determine whether the child supplied information relevant to each prototype component. If so, it was compared with information provided by parents to assess component accuracy. The completeness proportion was derived separately for central and peripheral components as well as combined to form a total completeness score. The completeness of a child's recall was calculated by dividing the number of component items correctly recalled by the number of component items that were relevant for that child according to parent report and thus could potentially have been recalled. For example, if parents identified 8 of the central components as relevant to their child’s injury but their child only correctly recalled 6 of them, she was a given a proportion score of .75 for injury central completeness. Only components that were accurately recalled are presented here; errors in recalling prototype components are presented below. This scoring is identical to that used in prior reports about injuries requiring emergency room treatment (Peterson & Bell, 1996; Peterson & Whalen, 2001).
Accuracy of completeness components. Only commission errors were counted, i.e., instances in which a child stated information that was explicitly contradicted by parental report. For most children, only one parent was interviewed. For those few families in which both parents were interviewed, their information was never contradictory. Although using parental report as the ‘gold standard’ for accuracy is not ideal, it is the only viable option for unexpected real-world events such as the ones used here. However, all parental information against which children’s reports were compared was derived from the initial visit which took place a few days after injury. Parents were never re-interviewed and thus potential deterioration of their reports over time is not an issue. Use of parent-child information convergence this way to assess accuracy has been done in a number of prior reports (e.g., Peterson, 1999; Peterson & Bell, 1996; Peterson & Whalen, 2001). The number of errors about prototype components were separated into central versus peripheral information. Then, the percentage accuracy of the components recalled by children was calculated, i.e., the proportion of those components that were accurate rather than commission errors. Instead of using the possible components that children potentially could have remembered as the denominator in calculations (as in the completeness measure described above), this measure used the actual components that children did provide as the denominator in calculations and then the proportion of those components that was accurate was derived. That is, the number of correct prototype components in each category was divided by the total number of components they provided, i.e., the sum of correct plus commission errors. For example, if a child provided 6 correct central components of her injury and 1 commission error, her proportion accuracy score was .86. Scoring was identical to that used in prior reports (Peterson & Bell, 1996; Peterson & Whalen, 2001).
Unique narrative detail. Each unique unit of information introduced by the child was counted. The total number of unique units was tabulated, which included details pertaining to person (‘Nan picked me up’), location (‘I was at the park’), action (‘I was running ’), object (‘there was a rock’), and attribute (‘it was sharp’). Scoring was the same as that developed by Fivush (1991) and used in a number of subsequent studies including one about similar injury events (Peterson & Roberts, 2003). These unique information units were not divided into central versus peripheral details because of difficulty with classification. Consider the following: “I hit a piece of the porch that was sticking up and had nails in it because daddy had starting fixing it last weekend but he didn’t finish it ‘cause he ran out of nails and had to go to the store again.” The object involved in the injury (piece of the porch) is a central component of the injury prototype, but is each of the elaborating details about that object, including the history of why it was in its state at that time, also perceived by children as central? Although Christianson and Loftus (1991) define any detail or element that is associated with a central element as central rather than peripheral, others do not (Heuer & Reisberg, 1992) and there was no way of knowing if a particular child did so.
Accuracy of unique narrative detail. Adult witness transcripts were searched to assess the accuracy of each unique unit of information provided by children, i.e., whether or not it was a commission error. Not all unique units could be assessed for accuracy; a mean of 87.5% (range = 47% to 100% for different children) of unique units could be coded as either accurate units or commission errors and for the remainder, adults did not provided relevant information that would allow coding for accuracy. Accuracy is defined as the number of details confirmed as correct divided by the number confirmed as correct plus commission errors.
Reliability of scoring. To establish reliability for completeness, prototype components were first identified in the children’s transcripts. Two raters independently scored 15% of the transcripts, and agreement (scored as the number of agreements divided by the number of agreements plus disagreements) was 98% for the presence of scorable components in the transcripts, i.e., their completeness. Agreement for classification of components into central versus peripheral categories was 91%. To establish reliability for the accuracy of children’s recall of prototype components, two raters compared 15% of the children’s transcripts with parent transcripts to verify accuracy of identified components, and reliability (again, number of agreements over agreements plus disagreements) was 90%. One of the raters then scored the remainder of the transcripts for completeness and accuracy. For the number of unique units of information, two raters scored 15% of the transcripts; agreement was 92% for identification of unique units of information and 84% for accuracy of those units. One of the raters then scored the remainder. 
Results
Data on children’s recall of their injury experiences will be presented separately for four types of data: (1) the completeness of their recall (i.e., the proportion of relevant prototype components that are recalled), (2) the accuracy of completeness components, (3) the number of narrative details, and (4) the accuracy of those narrative details. Data relevant to completeness are broken down into whether prototype components are central or peripheral. As well, total completeness scores are presented; these are the sum of central and peripheral components and therefore present an overall picture of children’s completeness. For analyses of narrative detail (both frequency and accuracy), the total amount of narrative detail (summing over the various types of information) is presented as well as data on the individual types of detail. Data are presented for all three interviews – initial, 1 year follow-up, and 2 year follow-up – and include all 201 children in the initial and 1 year interview but only 145 children in the 2 year interview. Because more children participated in the initial and 1-year interviews, all analyses of variance were run twice: (1) on all 201 participants, with time having 2 levels (initial & 1-year interview), and (2) on 145 participants, with time having 3 levels (all three interviews). As well, the initial and 1 year scores of the 56 children who were not available after 2 years were compared with the scores of the 145 children who were, and these two groups did not differ. Because findings did not differ depending on whether 201 or 145 children were used, for simplicity only analyses of the 145 children available for all three interviews are presented.
Completeness of Recall
Table 1 shows the mean percentage completeness of children’s recall during initial, 1-year, and 2-year interviews. Children’s completeness scores were analyzed via a 5 (Age) × 2 (Gender) × 2 (Centrality) × 3 (Time) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with age and gender both between subjects variables, centrality (central vs. peripheral) a within subjects variable, and time a repeated measure. Because there were no effects of gender, alone or in interaction, data are not separated into gender in Table 1. Parallel to results reported previously with a smaller sample, children had more complete recall with age, F(4, 135) = 37.70, p < .001, η2 = .528. The mean percentage recall of all prototype components for the different age groups was 51.0%, 67.6%, 78.8%, 81.2%, and 82.0% for the youngest through oldest groups, respectively. Post-hoc Tukey HSD tests showed that 2-year-olds were less complete than were 3/4-year-olds, and both of these groups were less complete than were all three older groups which did not differ from each other. As well, information centrality was significant, F(1, 135) = 92.63, p < .001, η2 = .407, with 78.5% of central components but only 66.7% of peripheral components recalled. There were no other significant effects. Importantly, there was no significant deterioration in recall completeness over 2 years, regardless of age.
Accuracy of Completeness Components
The accuracy of the components used to score recall completeness is shown in Table 2. Specifically, the proportion of components that were correct in comparison with the total number of components provided by children (i.e., both accurate ones and commission errors) is presented. These data were analyzed via a 5 (Age) × 2 (Gender) × 2 (Centrality) × 3 (Time) ANOVA with age and gender both between subject variables, centrality a within subject variable, and time a repeated measure. Girls (M = 88.9%) were significantly more accurate than boys (M =87.0%), F(1, 134) = 4.97, p = .028, η2 = .036 (i.e., had proportionately fewer commission errors), although the absolute difference is small. Because gender interacted with no other factors and the difference was minimal, for simplicity the data in Table 2 are not presented separately by gender. Older children were more accurate than younger, F(4, 134) = 16.90, p < .001, η2 = .335. The mean percentage accuracy of all prototype components for the different age groups was 74.9%, 81.9%, 85.2%, 86.5%, and 95.2% for the youngest through oldest groups, respectively. In contrast to the completeness analyses above, children became less accurate with time (i.e., made proportionately more commission errors), F(2, 268) = 32.44, p < .001, η2 = .195. There was both a linear (F(1, 134) = 45.17, p < .001, η2 = .252) and a quadratic (F(1, 134) = 16.64, p < .001, η2 = .110) component to the main effect of time, illustrating both that completeness accuracy decreased over time and that the sharpest decrease was between the first and second interviews. However, this pattern interacted with age since there was a significant time x age interaction, F(8, 268) = 2.33, p = .019, η2 = .65, although only the quadratic component was significant, F(4, 134) = 3.18, p = .016, η2 = .087. This time x age interaction reflects the fact that the deterioration in accuracy (i.e., increase in commission errors over time) was different for children in different age groups, and is depicted in Figure 1. 
The centrality of the prototype components also was significant: children recalled central components (M = 89.4%) better than peripheral ones (M = 86.4%), F(1, 134) = 9.86, p = .002, η2 = .069. However, this was complicated by a centrality x age interaction, F(4, 134) = 3.25, p = .014, η2 = .088, depicted in Figure 2. To explore this interaction, 2 (Centrality) × 2 (Gender) × 3 (Time) ANOVAs were calculated for each age group separately. Central components were likely to be recalled proportionately more accurately than peripheral ones for 2-year-olds (p = .025) and marginally more accurately for 3/4-year-olds (p = .051). Thus, only younger children were less accurate at recalling peripheral components; older children recalled both central and peripheral components with equivalent accuracy.
Amount of Unique Narrative Detail	
The number of unique narrative details included by children in their memory reports has not heretofore been presented for children recalling emergency-room injuries, and to analyze how informative children’s reports were, a 5 (Age) × 2 (Gender) × 3 (Time) ANOVA was computed on the total number of all unique details, with age and gender between subject variables and time a repeated measure. These data are presented in Table 3; since gender was not a significant factor, alone or in interaction, data are not presented separately by gender. Older children were more informative than younger, F(4, 135) = 20.26, p < .001, η2 = .375, Ms = 21.3, 39.1, 47.8, 54.6, and 54.8 unique details for children in the youngest through oldest groups, respectively. Post-hoc Tukey HSD tests showed that 2-year-olds provided fewer narrative details than did 3/4-year-olds, and both of these groups provided fewer details than did all three older groups which did not differ from each other.  There was also a significant effect of time, F(2, 270) = 22.31, p < .001, η2 = .142. There was both a linear (F(1, 135) = 32.21, p < .001, η2 = .193) and a quadratic (F(1, 135) = 9.78, p = .002, η2 = .068) component to the main effect of time, illustrating both that the number of unique narrative details increased, and that there was only a small increase in the amount of narrative detail from the initial to the 1-year interview (40.8 versus 41.8 details, respectively), but a large increase from the 1-year to the 2-year interview (51.7 details for the latter). Thus, with time, children provided more information, not less, about their injury experience. 
The frequencies of the different types of narrative detail (i.e., persons, objects, attributes, locations, and actions) are presented in Table 4. To explore how the frequencies of the various types of narrative detail changed over time, a 5 (Age) × 2 (Gender) × 3 (Time) multivariate analysis of variance was done on the five types of detail, with time a repeated measure. As with the ANOVA using the total number of narrative details, i.e., summing across the five different types of detail, there were significant main effects of both age and time. However, our interest here is with the different types of detail. The main effect of detail type was significant, Wilks F(4, 132) = 153.30, p < .001, η2 = .823, due to various types of detail having different frequencies. These frequencies ranged from 3.8 location details to 13.2 action details. In addition, the type of detail interacted with both time, Wilks F(8, 128) = 3.35, p = .002, η2 = .173, and age, Wilks F(16, 540) = 5.56, p < .001, η2 = .169. 
To explore these interactions, separate 5 (Age) × 2 (Gender) × 3 (Time) ANOVAs were computed on each of the five different types of narrative detail. There was a main effect of time for all five types of detail: F(2, 270) = 10.14, p < .001, η2 = .070 for persons, F(2, 270) = 4.54, p = .011, η2 = .033 for objects, F(2, 270) = 12.13, p < .001, η2 = .082 for attributes, F(2, 270) = 14.76, p < .001, η2 = .099 for location, and F(2, 270) = 11.68, p < .001, η2 = .080 for actions. However, although there was a linear component for all five types of detail (F(1, 135) = 14.84, p < .001, η2 = .099 for persons, F(1, 135) = 7.66, p = .006, η2 = .054 for objects, F(1, 135) = 21.62, p < .001, η2 = .138 for attributes, F(1, 135) = 18.08, p < .001, η2 = .118 for location, and F(1, 135) = 13.75, p < .001, η2 = .092 for actions), there was also a quadratic component for location details (F(1, 135) = 10.54, p = .001, η2 = .072) and actions (F(1, 135) = 8.70, p = .004, η2 = .061). Thus, there was an increase over time for all types of detail, but for location and activity details, the increase was much greater between the 1-year and 2-year follow-up than between the initial and first follow-up interviews (see Table 4). In addition, the amount of increase varied for different types of detail: children provided approximately one new narrative detail of each type for people, objects, and locations, but three new details about both attributes and actions.
In terms of age, there was not a main effect of age for all five types of detail; rather, there was an age main effect only for objects (F(4, 135) = 7.68, p < .001, η2 = .185), attributes (F(4, 135) = 9.49, p < .001, η2 = .219), and locations (F(4, 135) = 20.04, p < .001, η2 = .373). For both the number of object and attribute narrative details provided by children, Tukey HSD tests showed that 2-year-olds provided fewer than did all older age groups, which did not differ from each other. For location details, with increasing age each group provided more location details than did children in younger groups with the exception of the two oldest age groups, who provided the same number of details (Ms = 2.0, 3.2, 4.1, 4.9, and 5.1 for the youngest through oldest age groups, respectively). For ANOVAs on the number of object, attribute, and location details, there were no other significant effects besides time and age. In contrast, for the number of action details there was no main effect of age but a significant Time × Age interaction, F(8,270) = 2.70, p = .007, η2 = .074. To explore this interaction, a Time (3) × Gender (2) ANOVA was calculated for each age group separately. For both the youngest and oldest age groups, time was nonsignificant. However, there was a linear increase in the number of action details over time for 3-4-year-olds, and a quadratic increase over time for both 5-6-year-olds and 8-9-year-olds. There was also no main effect of age for the number of persons provided by children, although there was a significant age x gender interaction, F(4, 135) = 3.32, p = .013, η2 = .090. To explore this interaction, the analysis was repeated for each gender separately. For girls, the number of narrative details about persons increased with age, F(4, 68) = 4.38, p = .003, η2 = .205, but there was no significant age effect for boys (p = .878). Rather, the number of person details remained the same across age for boys.
Accuracy of Unique Narrative Detail
The percentage accuracy of children’s narrative details is presented in Table 5. These data represent the proportion of narrative details that were correct in comparison with all recalled details, i.e., correct ones plus commission errors. Accuracy assessments could not be made on 12.5% of the unique narrative details provided by children. For those details which were able to be classified as correct or not, the proportion that was correct was analyzed in a 5 (Age) × 2 (Gender) × 3 (Time) ANOVA, with time a repeated measure. Because gender was not significant, alone or in interaction, data on the accuracy of children’s unique details are not presented separately by gender in Table 5. Children became proportionately more accurate (i.e., made proportionately fewer commission errors) with age, F(4, 135) = 18.28, p < .001, η2 = .351. The mean percentage accuracy for unique narrative details was 77.5%, 84.5%, 89.8%, 94.4%, and 95.2% for the youngest through oldest groups, respectively. Post-hoc Tukey HSD tests showed that 2-year-olds were proportionately less accurate than were 3/4-year-olds, and both of these groups were proportionately less accurate than were all three older groups which did not differ from each other. The effect of time was also significant, F(2, 270) = 17.37, p < .001, η2 = .114; only the linear (not the quadratic) component of time was significant, F(1, 135) = 26.64, p < .001, η2 = .165. Accuracy of unique narrative details decreased from 92.4% to 85.6% over the two years of interviews.
The percentage accuracy of the different types of narrative detail (i.e., persons, objects, attributes, locations, and activities) is presented in Table 6. To explore how the accuracy of the various types of narrative detail changed over time, another Age × Gender × Time multivariate analysis of variance was done on the five types of detail. As with the ANOVA using the total number of narrative details, i.e., summing across the five different types of detail, there were significant main effects of both age and time. Likewise, there was a significant effect of detail type, Wilks F(4, 132) = 36.96, p < .001, η2 = .528, due to various types of detail having different accuracy rates. These ranged from 88.8% accuracy for location details to 68.8% for attributes. In addition, the type of detail interacted with age, Wilks F(16, 404) = 2.43, p = .002, η2 = .068, and gender, Wilks F(4, 132) = 2.57, p = .041, η2 = .072. However, there was no interaction between detail type and time, suggesting that accuracy decreased equivalently for all types of narrative detail, or in other words, children were equally likely to increase the proportion of commission errors they made regardless of the type of content. 
To explore the interactions between detail type and both age and gender, separate Age × Gender × Time ANOVAs were computed on each of the five different types of narrative detail. For each type of detail, the main effect of age was significant: F(4, 135) = 8.15, p < .001, η2 = .195 for persons, F(4, 135) = 8.12, p < .001, η2 = .194 for objects, F(4, 135) = 14.99, p < .001, η2 = .308 for attributes, F(4, 135) = 6.01, p < .001, η2 = .151 for location, and F(4, 135) = 10.42, p < .001, η2 = .236 for actions. However, post-hoc Tukey HSD tests showed that the pattern of age effects was different for different types of detail. In terms of the accuracy of narrative details about both persons and objects, 2-year-olds were proportionately less accurate about person details than were children in the three oldest age groups, who in turn did not differ from each other; as well, 3-4-year-olds were proportionately less accurate about person details than were 12-13-year-olds. For narrative details about attributes, children in the two youngest groups did not differ from each other although they were proportionately less accurate than were children in all three older groups. Furthermore, 5-6-year-olds were proportionately less accurate than were 12-13-year-olds, and children in the two oldest age groups did not differ. In terms of details about location, 2-year-olds were significantly less accurate about location than were children in the three oldest age groups, which in turn did not differ from each other, but 3-4-year-olds differed from no other group. Finally, in terms of children’s accuracy about actions, children in the youngest two age groups differed from those in the oldest two groups, children in the middle age group differed only from those in the oldest group, and children in the two oldest groups did not differ from each other. In terms of the interaction between detail type and gender, the main effect of gender was nonsignificant except for details about attributes, F(1, 135) = 5.22, p = .024, η2 = .037. Girls (M = 70.0%) were more accurate about attributes than were boys (M = 66.9%). There were no interactions between gender and other factors for any type of detail. 
To summarize, older children of course had more complete, informative, and accurate recall than younger, and gender was mostly negligible although there were occasional small effects favoring girls. Of more interest is how children’s reports changed over time. The completeness of their reports did not change whereas the amount of narrative detail increased over time for every type of detail, and especially for actions and attributes. Only accuracy deteriorated over time, with children making proportionately more commission errors, and this was true for both completeness components and narrative details. As well, central completeness components were recalled better than peripheral ones.  
Discussion
When children are recalling a highly salient and stressful event, the completeness of their recall in terms of components of the overall event, the amount of narrative detail they provide, and the accuracy of their reports seem to follow different paths over time. Although common wisdom is that the quality of children’s reports deteriorates over time, this report suggests that it all depends upon what aspect of those reports is being considered. Although accuracy (i.e., the proportion of information identified as commission errors) indeed is worse as the delay between event occurrence and recollection is greater, this is not true for children’s recall of the structural components (i.e., completeness) of the event, which remains unchanged over time. Nor is it true for the amount of elaborative detail that children provide, which increases. This investigation was motivated by the need to shed light on the divergent conclusions different investigations have come to about children’s long-term memory for highly salient events, and it appears that part of that explanation may be due to different researchers coding different aspects of children’s memory reports. 
All of these measures code different, yet important, aspects of children’s recall. In terms of how well children provide information relevant to the overall structure of the event (i.e., information about where, who, what happened, and so on), they recalled on average three-quarters of those components identified as central to their injury experience and two-thirds of those identified as peripheral, for a total recall completeness of about 73%. This study extended (using a larger sample size) earlier studies that reported little change in recall completeness for injury events (Peterson, 1999; Peterson & Bell, 1996; Peterson & Whalen, 2001). The fact that central components were recalled better than peripheral ones also replicates other research investigating information centrality (Goodman et al., 1991; Peters, 1987; Peterson & Bell, 1996; Vandermaas et al., 1993). However, as one would expect when such a large age range is investigated, there were substantial differences in completeness depending upon children’s age. Two-year-olds recalled only about half of the relevant components of their injury whereas the older children recalled more. But importantly, there was little decrease in completeness over the 2 years investigated here. These events were so salient that they continued to be well recalled, even 2 years later. 
In contrast to children’s reports remaining equivalently complete across time, they contained more narrative detail in subsequent interviews. By their 2-year follow-up interview, children provided on average one additional narrative detail about each of the categories of person, location, and object, and three additional details about both attributes and actions. In other words, they provided a more detailed account for every type of information that had been scored, and this increase was particularly sharp between the 1-year and 2-year follow-up interview. Thus, as children’s linguistic competence increased, it was reflected by greater narrative elaboration. It should be noted that an increase across age in narrative elaboration has been found for many years, but this is when children are studied cross-sectionally and thus children of different ages are providing initial reports of events. For example, Peterson and McCabe (1983) in an early report found systematic increases in narrative structural sophistication and elaboration across the preschool and elementary years, and many reports since then have shown increasing competence across age in a host of narrative skills (see review in Nelson & Fivush, 2004), including the amount of elaborative detail they include. However, the current study suggests that such an increase in detail seems to be true not only for narratives that are first constructed at a particular age by different children but also for the same children’s reports about the same events across time. This replicates (with a different scoring system and different event) what Fivush et al (2004) and Sales et al (2005) reported about children’s recall of a destructive hurricane. Parallel to the children recalling a hurricane, the children in the present investigation demonstrated reminiscence by providing new information in later interviews that had not been presented in earlier interviews. Such reminiscence effects have been frequently found over repeated interviews with both children and adults (La Rooy et al., 2005). Children also demonstrated hypermnesia since the total amount of detail increased over time. Thus, as children’s narrative competence increased, they provided more elaborative detail about events that they had recounted on previous occasions.
How can children maintain equivalent completeness scores over time and yet provide more information? The answer is related to how these two variables are scored. Recall the difference between “we were at my Nan’s” with “we were at my Nan’s, by the green shed that’s next to her house.” These two descriptions (provided by the same child about where she was injured in her initial and 2-year follow-up interview) are equivalent in terms of recall completeness since they both provide information relevant to the prototype component “where did the injury occur?” But the second description provides more narrative detail. It is possible that the increased narrative detail is due to parents talking about the events after each interview and thus children incorporating this additional information into their reports the next time they were interviewed. That is, children acquire post-event correct information through family discussions and this could inflate recall performance. However, if this is the primary explanation for the increase in information, it is odd that the largest increase occurred not between the first and second interview (when the injury was most talked about according to parental report) but between the second and third interview (when parents claimed that very little if any discussion of these events from long ago took place). 
Another possibility is that being asked direct questions in earlier interviews increases later recall for the aspects asked about. Such reinstatement effects are certainly well known phenomena that can assist long-term recall. As well, having a delayed earlier interview can lead to better long-term recall, probably due to memory reactivation being particularly effective after some forgetting has occurred (Pipe, Sutherland, Webster, Jones, & La Rooy, 2004). In terms of children’s recall of injuries requiring emergency room treatment, the effect of multiple interviews on completeness of injury prototype components and their proportion accuracy were explored in two previous studies of 3- to 9-year-old children. The first compared (a) children who had three interviews, immediately after injury and again 6 months and 1 year later, (b) children who had two interviews, immediately after injury and 1 year later, and (c) children who had only one interview, which was 1 year after injury (Tizzard-Drover & Peterson, 2004). Having an immediate interview (regardless of whether there was an extra one at 6 months) resulted in 3-4-year-olds having more complete and more accurate recall in their 1-year interview although there was no effect for older children. That is, having a detailed interview was beneficial for younger children’s recall, probably because the early interview provided a comprehensive reinstatement of the event. At 2 years post-injury there was no difference between groups in their recall of their injury, regardless of the number of prior interviews children had had or whether their first interview had been a week or a year after injury (Peterson, Pardy, Tizzard-Drover, & Warren, 2005). However, neither of these studies assessed the number of narrative details that children provided, only the number of completeness components and the proportion of them that were correct. Thus, it is possible that the increase in the number of narrative details children recall is related to having had earlier interviews to remind them.
A third possibility is that when interviewed 2 years later, children were more verbally competent and consequently were able to be more descriptive when talking about the same prototype components that they had told us about 2 years previously. That is, they provided the same fundamental tale of what had happened to them, but were now able to embellish it with more detail. In addition, they have learned more about cultural expectations for narratives and for how informative they are expected to be. In fact, considerable development in narrative skills is taking place over these ages (Nelson & Fivush, 2004), and such development is reflected in longer and more informative narratives. Yet another possibility is that children have an increased understanding of the social expectations surrounding an interview. That is, they have greater sensitivity to the perceived demands of an interview and know that they are expected to provide more detailed information.  
The story is different, however, when accuracy is considered. In this respect, children’s reports clearly get worse. That is, they make more commission errors over time. This is true for the accuracy of components used in the scoring of completeness and for the accuracy of narrative details. However, one should not lose sight of the substantial overall accuracy of children’s reports even two years later. For the proportion accuracy of completeness components, accuracy slips from about 92% to 85%, and for the proportion accuracy of narrative detail, accuracy decreases from about 92% to 86%. A decrease in accuracy and increase in commission errors across time has been found in many reports (see a meta-analytic review by Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & McGorty, 2004). 
Interestingly, the decrease in accuracy across time was equivalent for central and peripheral components of report completeness; the decrease in accuracy was also equivalent for all five types of detail content. However, that doesn’t mean that all types of content were recalled with equivalent accuracy. For younger children only, peripheral components were recalled less accurately than were central components, whereas older children recalled both types of components with equivalent accuracy. And for all children, attributes were recalled with considerably less accuracy (approximately 69% of such details were correct) than were other types of details, especially those pertaining to locations (approximately 89% were correct). 
Gender had relatively little effect on children’s recall. However, girls were more accurate than boys in terms of completeness components, although this difference was very modest (88.9% versus 87.0%). Thus, although it was statistically significant, it had little practical importance. In addition, there were some gender differences associated with specific types of narrative detail. Girls were more accurate than boys when providing narrative details about attributes (70.0% versus 66.9%). As well, girls provided more narrative details about people as their age increased, whereas boys of all ages continued to provide the same number of person details. Prior research has found that girls are likely to refer to more people in their narratives than are boys (Buckner & Fivush, 1998, 2000), and that mothers are likely to place events within a more interpersonal context when talking with their daughters than their sons (Fivush, Berlin, Sales, Mennuti-Washburn, & Cassidy, 2003). Thus, the modest gender differences that were found here are consistent with findings of other research that was quite different in methods and narrative topics.
To summarize, children’s recall completeness, provision of narrative detail, and accuracy seem to follow different paths over time in children’s reports about a highly salient event. Narrative details increase while accuracy decreases, and children continue to provide the same overall structure when describing the event (i.e., are equivalently complete). A focus by different investigators on different aspects of children’s memory reports about highly salient events, along with use of different coding schemes, may help to explain why there is such discrepancy in conclusions between different investigators about what happens to children’s memory reports over time. In terms of forensic implications, the general belief that children’s reports get worse over time is too simplistic. It is only the accuracy of their reports that deteriorates, and the current study suggests that that deterioration is quite modest, even for young children. In contrast, as they get older, children increasingly come to understand that interviewers both want and expect them to provide a lot of information about events, and in particular to include in their reports information about who, what, where, when, how, and why. They also have better linguistic and cognitive skills that enable them to be more elaborative in their reports. One consequence of this developing understanding of narrative structure and cultural expectations is that children’s free recalls (the traditional beginning of a forensic interview) get longer and more informative over time. Even when interviewers turn to prompting questions, children understand that more is better when it comes to providing information. Also comforting is the fact that children’s understanding of the overall event, its structure and components, does not deteriorate either. It is only details here and there that deteriorate. And this deterioration is across the board in terms of the type of information (persons, objects, attributes and activities). The one exception is that details about location seem to be forgotten less than other types of details. 
There are limitations in the present study and foremost is the fact that we were unable to interview the children until several days had passed. It is unfortunate that children could not have been interviewed before there had been rehearsal of the events with relatives and friends, but ethical considerations when studying naturally-occurring events leave little choice. After all, the events were big news that of course would have been widely discussed, and ethically one cannot interview families until they have had an opportunity to calmly consider whether they wish to participate in research. Nor did we have any control over how much these events were talked about between interviews, although parents said that after children were healed these events became ‘old news’ and were seldom if ever mentioned. In fact, parents were typically quite surprised at how well their children recalled the events two years later and said that they hadn’t talked about the events since the last time we had visited, if then. As well, not all of the children’s details were able to be confirmed, and so it is possible that unconfirmed details were not distributed the way confirmed details were in terms of accuracy. As well, reminisced information is vulnerable to errors (Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; La Rooy et al., 2005). Nevertheless, the fact that the sample size was so large suggests that the findings are likely to be robust. 
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Prototype Of Interview About the Injury With Examples Of Items And Classification As Central (C) or Peripheral (P) 

Item	Example	Category
Time of day 	"Right after lunch"	P 
Place 	"In my backyard"	P 
Who was with you	"Mom and my brother Joe"	P 
Who else was around	"My friend Anna was playing there too"	P 
Actions prior to injury 	"I was running"	P 
The injury 	"I got a big cut on my leg"	C
How it occurred 	"I was tripped"	C
Who did it	"By my brother"	C
What objects involved	"I hit a piece of the porch that was sticking up"	C
Cry	"I had to just scream"	C
Blood	"It was bleeding all down my leg"	C
Who first responded 	"Mommy heard me cry"	C
Where you went before hosp.	"She took me into the kitchen"	P 
Actions to treat injury	"She wiped my knee"	C
Objects of home treatment	"And put a cloth on my knee to soak up blood"	C
Anyone else look/help?	"My brother was watching"	P 
Went to hospital 	"Then I went to the hospital"	C
Who took you to hospital 	"Mom drove me there"	P 
Who else went along	"My brother had to come too"	P 





Recall Completeness: Means (and SDs) of Completeness Component Percentages (Central, Peripheral, and Total Components) During Initial, 1-Year, and 2-Year Follow-up Interviews *

Age inYears 	Na	Nb	Centrality ofInformation	Interview
				Initial 	1-Year	2-Year 
2 	21	17	Central	48.7 (16.7)	58.6 (22.8)	59.9 (22.6)
			Peripheral	40.7 (20.5)	50.0 (24.2)	47.4 (17.8)
			Total	44.6 (15.4)	54.6 (21.2)	53.8 (18.1)
3/4 	65	39	Central	72.8 (18.0)	70.0 (20.9)	74.0 (16.3)
			Peripheral	57.4 (18.0)	63.1 (21.2)	65.4 (16.4)
			Total	66.3 (15.0)	66.1 (18.2)	70.5 (14.3)
5/6 	68	48	Central	84.6 (10.7)	83.2 (16.5)	84.1 (15.0)
			Peripheral	72.7 (13.2)	74.8 (16.6)	70.2 (17.2)
			Total	79.2 (8.7)	79.3 (13.1)	77.9 (12.6)
8/9 	23	21	Central	89.8 (11.5)	81.7 (15.2)	85.4 (11.0)
			Peripheral	79.8 (10.2)	70.2 (14.2)	76.1 (14.0)
			Total	85.5 (8.9)	76.8 (11.4)	81.2 (9.7)
12/13 	24	20	Central	92.3 (10.1)	87.0 (9.6)	82.8 (12.9)
			Peripheral	77.4 (13.0)	73.8 (17.8)	75.2 (11.2)
			Total	85.6 (9.2)	81.3 (10.8)	79.0 (8.8)
All	201	145	Central	78.6 (18.7)	76.6 (19.9)	78.6 (17.5)
			Peripheral	65.8 (19.5)	67.8 (20.4)	67.9 (17.9)
			Total	72.9 (17.0)	72.4 (17.6)	73.7 (15.3)
* Note: Data on 96 children from Peterson (1999) are included in the total information category in the initial and 2-year data, although that report did not break down the recalled information into central versus peripheral, nor report 1-year follow-up data. 
a The number of participants in the Initial and 1-Year interview.




Completeness Accuracy: Means (and SDs) of Accuracy Percentages for Completeness Components (Central, Peripheral, and Total Components) During Initial, 1-Year, and 2-Year Follow-up Interviews *

Age inYears 	Centrality ofInformation	Interview
		Initial 	1-Year	2-Year 
2 	Central	88.1 (10.1)	79.9 (22.8)	84.5 (10.7)
	Peripheral	79.3 (24.7)	63.6 (24.6)	69.8 (17.9)
	Total	84.3 (14.1)	73.6 (18.7)	74.9 (10.2)
3/4 	Central	90.1 (11.0)	81.5 (17.3)	84.9 (14.4)
	Peripheral	85.8 (16.2)	79.2 (18.8)	78.1 (18.8)
	Total	87.9 (10.2)	80.6 (14.8)	81.9 (13.2)
5/6 	Central	95.1 (6.9)	86.5 (12.7)	87.1 (13.8)
	Peripheral	93.1 (11.0)	88.1 (13.4)	82.7 (19.5)
	Total	94.1 (7.0)	87.2 (9.0)	85.2 (12.7)
8/9 	Central	98.3 (5.1)	90.5 (9.9)	86.2 (12.0)
	Peripheral	97.9 (5.5)	92.1 (10.5)	87.0 (12.2)
	Total	97.9 (3.6)	90.9 (7.7)	86.5 (9.6)
12/13 	Central	98.5 (5.4)	94.0 (8.3)	93.3 (10.0)
	Peripheral	97.8 (5.4)	93.3 (14.3)	97.4 (6.3)
	Total	98.2 (3.6)	93.9 (8.3)	95.2 (6.4)
All	Central	93.7 (9.1)	85.7 (15.2)	87.1 (13.1)
	Peripheral	90.7 (14.7)	84.3 (18.1)	83.2 (18.2)
	Total	92.1 (9.6)	85.0 (13.4)	84.9 (12.6)

* Note: Data on 96 children from Peterson (1999) are included in the total category in initial and 2-year data. 
Table 3
Total Number of Unique Narrative Details: Means (and SDs) for the Number of Narrative Details Provided During Initial, 1-Year, and 2-Year Follow-up Interviews 

Age in		Interview	
Years	Initial 	1 Year	2 Year 
2 	18.6 (11.8)	19.9 (9.3)	25.5 (11.1)
3/4 	33.2 (12.9)	38.9 (16.3)	45.3 (17.7)
5/6 	43.8 (16.2)	42.3 (15.6)	57.2 (19.6)
8/9 	50.5 (14.3)	49.8 (18.6)	63.4 (19.6)
12/13 	54.9 (17.8)	51.3 (15.3)	58.2 (20.8)





Types of Narrative Details: Means (and SDs) for the Number of Narrative Details Provided About Different Content During Initial, 1-Year, and 2-Year Follow-up Interviews 
Age inYears	Interview	Type of Detail
		Persons	Objects	Attributes	Locations	Activities
2	Initial	4.2 (2.3)	2.6 (2.6)	3.2 (4.1)	1.7 (1.2)	4.8 (3.2)
	1 Year	5.3 (2.1)	3.8 (3.2)	5.1 (4.1)	2.1 (1.5)	5.8 (3.5)
	2 Year	5.5 (3.1)	4.2 (2.2)	6.2 (3.9)	2.2 (1.4)	6.1 (3.8)
3/4	Initial	4.8 (2.6)	5.6 (3.4)	8.2 (5.9)	3.0 (1.7)	9.6 (5.0)
	1 Year	5.2 (2.1)	6.2 (2.9)	10.0 (6.8)	3.3 (1.5)	11.4 (5.2)
	2 Year	6.6 (3.0)	6.8 (3.0)	12.4 (6.7)	3.4 (1.4)	12.3 (5.9)
5/6	Initial	5.6 (2.3)	6.8 (3.4 )	11.9 (6.1)	3.8 (1.6)	12.6 (6.1)
	1 Year	6.0 (2.6)	6.6 (3.2)	11.8 (6.4)	3.7 (2.0)	13.1 (5.7)
	2 Year	7.4 (3.7)	8.3 (4.4)	13.8 (6.0)	4.7 (1.7)	17.2 (6.8)
8/9	Initial	6.3 2.4)	7.6 (3.0)	9.5 (4.6)	4.3 (1.8)	16.1 (5.9)
	1 Year	6.0 (3.0)	7.1 (4.0)	10.5 (5.9)	4.3 (1.7)	15.3 (7.2)
	2 Year	8.1 (3.9)	8.3 (3.6)	13.2 (4.4)	6.2 (2.4)	19.7 (7.2)
12/13	Initial	6.8 (4.3)	8.6 (4.1)	14.2 (7.8)	4.8 (1.4)	19.3 (5.5)
	1 Year	6.3 (2.5)	7.5 (2.8)	13.2 (5.7)	4.8 (2.2)	17.5 (6.3)
	2 Year	5.5 (2.3)	8.4 (3.5)	13.4 (6.3)	5.6 (2.1)	18.2 (6.7)
All	Initial	5.4 (2.8 )	6.3 (3.7)	9.8 (6.6)	3.5 (1.8)	12.0 (6.7)
	1 Year	5.7 (2.4)	6.3 (3.3)	10.5 (6.5)	3.6 (1.9)	12.6 (6.3)





Accuracy of Narrative Details: Means (and SDs) for the Percentage of Details That Were Accurate During Initial, 1-Year, and 2-Year Follow-up Interviews 

Age in	Interview
Years	Initial 	1 Year	2 Year 
2 	80.4 (19.8)	76.7 (12.4)	75.3 (13.2)
3/4 	88.4 (10.3)	82.3 (15.2)	82.7 (12.2)
5/6 	94.1 (6.3)	90.0 (7.3)	85.2 (10.0)
8/9 	98.3 (2.8)	93.4 (8.8)	91.5 (9.8)
12/13 	98.8 (3.5)	93.2 (6.9)	93.7 (5.4)





Accuracy of Types of Narrative Details: Means (and SDs) for the Percentage Accuracy of Different Content During Initial, 1-Year, and 2-Year Follow-up Interviews 

Age inYears		Type of Detail
	Interview	Persons	Objects	Attributes 	Locations	Activities
2	Initial	60.6 (34.4)	69.4 (36.4)	52.1 (46.5)	81.8 (36.5)	81.3 (22.0)
	1 Year	65.0 (21.7)	71.1 (31.8)	62.9 (37.0)	75.3 (39.3)	71.0 (28.9)
	2 Year	62.6 (24.6)	60.5 (22.4)	53.4 (31.9)	67.6 (38.7)	70.0 (27.6)
3/4	Initial	82.0 (21.2)	84.3 (21.4)	66.8 (30.7)	86.8 (25.2)	85.1 (18.0)
	1 Year	72.4 (22.6)	74.0 (23.9)	59.7 (27.2)	82.8 (25.9)	74.1 (22.4)
	2 Year	71.2 (23.4)	72.2 (19.2)	59.8 (18.2)	88.2 (21.2)	74.2 (19.1)
5/6	Initial	86.6 (18.6)	88.0 (15.6)	77.0 (21.7)	93.9 (13.3)	87.6 (16.6)
	1 Year	80.9 (22.0)	80.8 (22.2)	66.8 (18.1)	87.9 (20.9)	80.9 (18.3)
	2 Year	76.4 (22.5)	78.8 (21.0)	64.8 (16.2)	91.2 (20.1)	78.8 (17.7)
8/9	Initial	90.6 (16.0)	95.8 (7.3)	88.7 (20.0)	96.7 (11.4)	95.2 (9.0)
	1 Year	80.5 (17.7)	86.2 (17.2)	73.2 (17.5)	94.8 (13.1)	83.5 (18.5)
	2 Year	73.4 (22.4)	77.6 (21.1)	73.3 (22.4)	91.5 (12.4)	83.2 (17.8)
12/13	Initial	92.7 (15.4)	95.1 (13.4)	93.7 (10.3)	98.3 (5.6)	97.2 (6.0)
	1 Year	84.0 (19.3)	88.3 (15.8)	80.0 (15.9)	96.7 (6.8)	93.7 (8.2)
	2 Year	84.2 (15.5)	80.6 (21.3)	80.4 (14.8)	96.3 (6.8)	94.3 (6.4)
All	Initial	83.6 (22.5)	86.6 (21.0)	74.4 (29.6)	91.2 (21.0)	88.2 (16.8)
	1 Year	76.8 (22.0)	79.1 (23.3)	66.4 (24.3)	86.8 (24.0)	79.5 (21.1)















Figure 2. The Centrality × Age Interaction for the accuracy of completeness prototype components. 










